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Abstract. Ethereum smart contracts are public, immutable and dis-
tributed and, as such, they are prone to vulnerabilities sourcing from
programming mistakes of developers. This paper presents SAFEVM, a
verification tool for Ethereum smart contracts that makes use of state-
of-the-art verification engines for C programs. SAFEVM takes as input
an Ethereum smart contract (provided either in Solidity source code, or
in compiled EVM bytecode), optionally with assert and require verification
annotations, and produces in the output a report with the verification
results. Besides general safety annotations, SAFEVM handles the verifica-
tion of array accesses: it automatically generates SV-COMP verification
assertions such that C verification engines can prove safety of array ac-
cesses. Our experimental evaluation has been undertaken on all contracts
pulled from etherscan.io (more than 24,000) by using as back-end verifiers
CPAchecker, SeaHorn and VeryMax.
1 Overview of SAFEVM
Each blockchain provides its own programming language to implement smart
contracts. Solidity, a Turing complete language, is the most popular language to
write smart contracts for the Ethereum platform that are then compiled to EVM
(Ethereum Virtual Machine [22]) bytecode. Each instruction executed by the EVM
has an associated gas consumption specified by Ethereum. Being security a main
concern of Ethereum, the Solidity language contains the verification-oriented
functions, assert and require, to check for safety conditions or requirements
and terminate the execution if they are not met. As usual, the assert function
can be used for verification purposes (e.g., to check invariants), while the require
function is used to specify preconditions (e.g., to ensure valid conditions on the
inputs or contract state variables, or to validate return values from calls to
external contracts). When the Solidity code is compiled into EVM bytecode, the
require condition is transformed into a test that checks the condition and invokes
a REVERT bytecode if it does not hold. REVERT aborts the whole execution of the
smart contract, reverts the state and all remaining gas is refunded to the caller.
The assert checks the condition and invokes an INVALID bytecode if it does not
hold. When executing INVALID, the state is reverted but no gas is refunded,
and hence it has more serious consequences than REVERT: besides the economic
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Fig. 1. SAFEVM’s architecture
consequences of losing the gas, the only information given to the transaction is
an out-of-gas error message. The treatment of array accesses is done similarly as
for the assert, when an array position is accessed, the generated EVM bytecode
checks if the position accessed is within the array bounds and otherwise the
INVALID bytecode is executed. Division and related bytecodes like MOD, SMOD,
ADDMOD, MULMOD, also lead to executing INVALID when the denominator is zero.
Therefore, the INVALID bytecodes are key for the verification of the Ethereum
smart contracts, as they capture both assertion violations and several sources
of fatal operations (e.g., out-of-bounds access, division by zero). In essence, our
approach to the verification of smart contracts consists in decompiling the EVM
bytecode for the smart contract into a C program with ERROR annotations (follow-
ing the SV-COMP format, https://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org/2019/rules.php) to
enable their verification using existing tools for the verification of C programs.
Developing the verifier from the low-level EVM has important advantages: (i)
sometimes the source code is not available (e.g., the blockchain only stores the
bytecode), (ii) the INVALID bytecodes are visible at the level of bytecode and we
can give a uniform treatment to the various safety concerns described above,
(iii) our analysis works for any other language that compiles to EVM (e.g., Vyper),
and it is not affected by changes in the source language, or by compiler opti-
mizations. Luckily, there are a number of open-source tools that help us in the
decompilation process and that we have integrated within our tool-chain.
Fig. 1 depicts the main components of SAFEVM that are as follows (shaded
boxes are off-the-shelf used systems not developed by us):
2
1. Input. SAFEVM takes a smart contract, optionally with assert and require
verification annotations. The smart contract can be given in Solidity source
code or in EVM compiled code. In the latter case, the annotations have been
compiled into bytecode as described above.
2. CFG. In either form, the code is given to Oyente [2], a symbolic execution
engine that has been extended to compute the complete CFG from the given
smart contract. As Oyente does not handle recursive functions, they are
already discarded at this step. The CFG generation phase is not described
in the paper, we refer to [2,3].
3. EthIR. The decompilation of the EVM bytecode into a higher-level rule-based
representation (RBR) is carried out from the generated CFG by EthIR [3].
Technical details of this phase are not described in the paper, we refer to [3].
4. C+SV-COMP translator. We have implemented a translator for the recur-
sive RBR representation into an abstract Integer C program (i.e., all data
is of type Integer) with verification annotations using the SV-COMP format.
Features of the EVM that we cannot handle yet (e.g., bit-wise operations)
are abstracted away in the translation (see Sec. 2). INVALID instructions are
transformed into ERROR annotations in the C program following the SV-COMP
format.
5. Verification. Any verification tool for Integer C programs that uses SV-COMP
annotations can be used to verify the safety of our C-translated contracts.
We have evaluated our approach using three state-of-the-art C verifiers,
CPAchecker [6], VeryMax [9], and SeaHorn [14], and the verification report
they produce is processed by us to report the results in terms of functions
of the smart contract.
Our tool SAFEVM has a very large (potential) user base, as Ethereum is
currently the most advanced platform for coding and processing smart contracts.
As we will describe in Sec. 3, using SAFEVM we have automatically verified safety
of around 20% of all functions (depending on the verifier) that might execute
INVALID bytecodes from the whole set of contracts pulled from etherscan.io (more
than 24,000 contracts), and we have found potential vulnerabilities in functions
that could not be verified.
2 Translation to C with SV-COMP Annotations
As motivating example, we use a Solidity contract that implements a lottery
system called SmartBillions (available at https://smartbillions.com/). We
illustrate the safety verification of its internal function commitDividend (an ex-
cerpt of its code appears to the left of Fig. 2) that commits remaining dividends
to the user wh. We have shortened the variable names by removing the vowels
from the names. Lines marked with !© might lead to executing different sources
of INVALID: Line 16 (L16 for short) to a division by zero when ttlSpply is 0;
at L19 when lst ≥ dvdnds.length and thus it is accessing a position out of the
bounds of the array; and at L21 when the condition within the assert does not
hold. In order to be able to verify its safety (i.e., absence of INVALID executions),
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1 contract SmartBillions {
2 struct Wallet {
3 ..., uint16 lstDvdndPrd;}
4 uint public dvdndPrd;
5 uint [] public dvdnds;
6 mapping(address => uint) blncs;
7 uint public ttlSpply ;
8 mapping (address => Wallet) wllts;
9
10 function commitDividend(address wh) {
11 +© //require( ttlSpply > 0);
12 +© //require(dvdndPrd < dvdnds.length);
13 uint lst =wllts[wh].lstDvdndPrd;
14 +© //require(dvdndPrd >= lst);
15 ...
16 !© uint shr=blncs[wh]∗0xffffffff/ttlSpply;
17 uint blnc = 0;
18 for (; lst<dvdndPrd;lst++) {
19 !© blnc += shr ∗ dvdnds[lst ];
20 }
21 !©+© assert( lst == dvdndPrd);
22 blnc = (blnc/0xffffffff);
23 ...
24 }
25 }
block734(s5 ,..., s0,g4,g1,g0,l3,l2) ←
... // block734instructions
call (jump734(s7,...,s0,g4,g1,g0,l3,l2))
jump734(s7,...,s0,g4,g1,g0,l3,l2) ←
geq(s7,s6), // lst≥dvdndPrd
call (block789(s5 ,..., s0,g4,g0,l3,l2))
jump734(s7,...,s0,g4,g1,g0,l3,l2) ←
lt (s7,s6), // lst<dvdndPrd
call (block745(s5 ,..., s0,g4,g1,g0,l3,l2))
block745(s5 ,..., s0,g4,g1,g0,l3,l2) ←
... // block745instructions
call (jump745(s9,...,s0,g4,g1,g0,l3,l2))
jump745(s9,...,s0,g4,g1,g0,l3,l2) ←
lt (s9,s8), // lst<dvdnds.length
call (block759(s7 ,..., s0,g4,g1,g0,l3,l2))
jump745(s9,...,s0,g4,g1,g0,l3,l2) ←
geq(s9,s8), // lst≥dvdnds.length
call (block758(s7 ,..., s0))
block758(s7 ,..., s0) ←
INVALID
block759(s7 ,..., s0,g4,g1,g0,l3,l2) ←
// block759instructions
...
s6 = s7+s6, // ADD
s6 = fresh0, // SLOAD
s7 = s4, // DUP3
...
call (block734(s5 ,..., s0,g4,g1,g0,l3,l2))
Fig. 2. Solidity code (left) and excerpt of RBR rules of for loop (lines 18-20)
we add the lines marked with +© that introduce error-handling functions require
and assert in the verification process.
The starting point of our translator is the RBR produced by EthIR [3]. The
RBR is composed of a set of rules containing decompiled versions of bytecode
instructions (e.g., LOAD and STORE are decompiled into assignments) and whose
structure of rule invocations is obtained from the CFG produced by Oyente. The
RBR might contain two kinds of rules: sequences of instructions referred to as
blockX, and conditional jump rules, named jumpX, whose first instruction is
the Boolean condition used to select between the rules of the function definition.
Rule parameters include: the operand stack flattened in variables named si, the
state of the contract (this is the global data), named gi, and the local memory
(represented by local variables), named li. To the right of Fig. 2 we show the
fragment of the RBR produced by EthIR for the loop of L18-L20. At rule block759
we show the transformation of some EVM bytecodes (the original bytecodes appear
in comments //) into higher-level RBR instructions. The RBR is already abstract
in the sense that when variables refer to state or memory locations that are not
known they become fresh variables (see variable fresh0 in block759) so that a
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posterior analysis will not assume any value for them (details are in [3]). Observe
that the fragment of the RBR contains an INVALID instruction within block758
and such block can be executed when geq(s9, s8) (see rule jump745). By tracking
variable assignments, we can infer that s9 contains the value of lst and s8 the
size of dvdnds, hence the comparison is checking out-of-bounds array access. The
remaining of the section explains the main four phases of the translation from
the RBR to an abstract Integer C program.
26 int g0 = VERIFIER nondet int();
27 ...
28 int g4 = VERIFIER nondet int();
29 int l0 = VERIFIER nondet int();
30 ...
31 int l3 = VERIFIER nondet int();
32 int who = VERIFIER nondet int();
33 int s0;
34 . . .
35 int s9;
36
37 void block758() {
38 ERROR: VERIFIER error();
39 }
40 void block734(){
41 init loop 0 :
42 // block734 instructions
43 if (s7 >= s6){ // jump734
44 block789();
45 goto end loop 0; }
46 // block745 instructions
47 if (s9 >= s8){ // jump745
48 block758();
49 goto end loop 0; }
50 // block759 instructions
51 s6 = s7 + s6
52 s6 = VERIFIER nondet int();
53 s7 = s4;
54 ...
55 goto init loop 0 ;
56 end loop 0: ;}
Fig. 3. C translated code with SV-COMP annotations
(1) C functions: Our translation produces, for each non-recursive rule defini-
tion in the RBR, a C function without parameters that returns void. Recursive
rules produced by loops are translated into iterative code. For this part of the
translation, we compute the SCC from the CFG (see Fig. 1) and model the de-
tected loops by means of goto instructions. Fig. 3 shows the obtained C functions
from the RBR program of Fig. 2. Note that jump rules are translated into an
if-then-else structure.
(2) Types of variables: Solidity basic, signed and unsigned data types are stored
into untyped 256-bit words in the EVM bytecode, and the bytecode does not in-
clude information about the actual types of the variables. Moreover, most EVM
operations do not distinguish among them except for few specific signed opera-
tions (SLT, SGT, SIGNEXTEND, SDIV and SMOD). As verifiers behave differently w.r.t.
overflow (see details in [6,9,14]), our translation allows the user to choose (by
means of a flag) if all variables are declared with type int in the C program, or
of type unsigned int with casting to int for sign-specific operations. The code in
Fig. 3 uses the default int transformation. Thus, although in EVM integers have
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overflow, the interpretation of them as unbounded integers or with overflow will
be determined by the available options in the C verification tool (e.g., VeryMax
only handles unbounded integers). Besides, instructions that contain fresh vari-
ables or that are not handled (like SLOAD) are translated into a call to function
__VERIFIER_nondet_int in order to model the lack of information for them during
verification. Observe that function block734 includes some operations over the
different integer variables. Arrays or maps are not visible in the EVM (nor in the
RBR). The only information that is trackable about arrays corresponds to their
sizes as it is stored in a stack variable that in the C program is stored in an
integer variable.
(3) Variable definitions: In order to enable reasoning on them (within their
scopes) during verification, SAFEVM translates them in the C program as follows:
(i) as we flattened the execution stack, we declare the stack variables as global C
variables to make them accessible to all C functions. These variables do not need
to be initialized as they take values in the program code; (ii) local variables are
defined as global C variables (L29-L31) because a function of the contract might
be translated into several C-functions, and all of them need to access the local
data. They are initialized at the beginning of the function corresponding to the
block in which they are firstly used; (iii) state variables are also translated into
global variables accessible by all functions and, as their values when functions
are verified are unknown, they are initialized using __VERIFIER_nondet_int (L26-
L28); and (iv) function input parameters are also defined as global variables (for
the same reason as (ii)), whose initial values are not determined (L32).
(4) SV-COMP annotations: The verification of Ethereum smart contracts is
done in SAFEVM by guaranteeing the unreachability of the INVALID operations
in the C-translated code. Following the SV-COMP rules, we translate INVALID oper-
ations into calls to the __VERIFIER_error function so that its unreachability can
be proven by any verification tool compatible with the SV-COMP annotations. An
example of an INVALID operation can be seen in L38. Verification tools return
that the program in Fig. 2 cannot be verified as the INVALID instruction could be
executed. This is due to the fact that contract state values are unknown, that is:
ttlSpply is not guaranteed to be different from 0 at L16 and the size of the array
dvdnds is not guaranteed to be greater than the value of lst at L19. Lines L11
and L12 contain the Solidity instructions needed to guarantee that L16 and L19,
respectively, will never execute an INVALID instruction. The assert at L21 can
be verified by using the require at L14. The inclusion of the require annotation
also improves the contract as, if it is violated, a REVERT rather than an INVALID
bytecode will be executed, not causing a loss of gas of the transaction (while the
gas needed to check it is negligible).
3 Experimental Evaluation
All components of SAFEVM, except for the C verifiers, are implemented in
Python and are open-source. SAFEVM accepts smart contracts written in ver-
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sions of Solidity up to 0.4.25 and bytecode for the Ethereum Virtual Machine
v1.8.18. This section reports the results of our experimental evaluation us-
ing SAFEVM with CPAchecker, SeaHorn and VeryMax as verification back-ends.
An artifact to try our tool can be downloaded from http://costa.fdi.ucm.es/
papers/costa/safevm.ova.
In order to experimentally evaluate SAFEVM, we pulled from etherscan.io
all Ethereum contracts whose source code was available on January 2018. This
ended up in 10,796 files. From those, we have searched for those files that contain
EVM code with INVALID instructions, in total 7,323. The first phase of SAFEVM
that performs the decompilation into the RBR fails for 1,000 files (this 13.65% is
larger but quite aligned with the failing rates of other tools e.g. [8,1]) and reaches
a timeout of 60s for 22 files. Thus, our results are on the remaining 6,301 files,
that contain 24,294 contracts with 44,046 public functions that can reach an
INVALID instruction and 177,549 INVALID-free functions. We have tested both the
translation to type int and unsigned int for defining C variables, as mentioned
in Sec. 2 for those 44,046 functions. We get the following results by using 60s of
timeout (Error denotes an error output by the verifier): It is a fake line
Results
CPAchecker VeryMax SeaHorn
int uint int uint int uint
Verified 19.48% 19.13% 20.32% 20.36% 21.71% 19.57%
Non-Verified 77.04% 79.82% 73.32% 73.44% 77.72% 80.15%
Timeout 3.21% 0.82% 6.29% 6.13% 0.57% 0.28%
Error 0.27% 0.23% 0.07% 0.07% 0% 0%
The results for all verifiers are quite aligned, although VeryMax verifies a
slightly lower number of functions, and SeaHorn verifies more functions and less
reach a timeout. The interpretation made by the tools regarding the Integer
semantics (bounded or unbounded) leads to the only relevant difference in the
number of functions verified between both translations.
We have manually inspected, out of the 7,323 files, those files whose addresses
start with 0x00 and 0x01 in order to understand the cases that could not be veri-
fied. This is a sample of 29 files (243 public functions) that are available at https:
//github.com/costa-group/EthIR/tree/master/examples/safevm. The manual in-
spection on the subset gives 54 false alarms (22.2%), namely: 49 functions were
verified by CPAchecker; 140 are correct alarms, most of them produced by asserts
introduced by the programmers for safety to abort the execution (e.g. 83 come
from Safemath); 54 are false alarms (many related to enum accesses and other
imprecisions in the decompilation phase). More in detail, we have identified four
types of situations: (1) false alarms due to inaccuracy of our tool : some assert
statements contain non-integer types (e.g., strings, enum, etc.) which cannot be
verified as we need a more accurate decompilation (see Sec. 4); (2) correct alarms
that require conditional verification: some assert statements can only be veri-
fied for concrete contexts, e.g., we found asserts to prevent from under/overflow
integer arithmetic operations in a widely used library SafeMath that can only be
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verified for given inputs. In the future we plan to integrate conditional verifi-
cation [9] to infer the preconditions for the asserts to hold; (3) Correct alarms
detecting potential vulnerabilities: we have detected several INVALID operations
that could represent a vulnerability in the code (e.g., functions that access an ar-
ray element without checking the boundary) and we have protected them adding
require statements that enable subsequent verification; and (4) four functions
whose verification results depend on the different semantics used for Integers.
As final observations, we notice that assert is overused (contradicting the
best practices recommendations of Solidity) and that some contracts can be
improved by using require to avoid the loss of gas when the assert statement
does not hold. Finally, we argue that although there is much room for improving
the accuracy, the results of our experimental evaluation are very encouraging:
we have verified safety w.r.t. INVALID bytecodes for around 20% of the functions
that might reach INVALID fully automatically by using state-of-the-art verifiers.
4 Conclusions
Verification of Ethereum smart contracts for potential safety and security vulner-
abilities is becoming a popular research topic with numerous tools being devel-
oped, among them, we have tools based on symbolic execution [18,13,20,17,15,21],
tools based on SMT solving [19,16], and other tools based on certified program-
ming [7,12,5]. There are some tools also that aim at detecting, analyzing and
verifying non-functional properties of smart contracts, e.g., those focused on
reasoning about the gas consumption [4,10,11,19].
To the best of our knowledge, SAFEVM is the first tool that uses existing
verification engines developed for C programs to verify low-level EVM code. This
opens the door to the applicability of advanced techniques developed for the
verification of C programs to the new languages used to code smart contracts.
Although our tool is still in a prototypical stage, it provides a proof-of-concept
of the transformational approach, and we argue that it constitutes a promising
basis to build verification tools for EVM smart contracts. Some of the aspects that
we aim at improving in future work is the handling of the data stored in the
memory, as it is abstracted away by the EthIR component that SAFEVM is using
as soon as there are storage operations on memory. Developing a memory analysis
for EVM smart contracts can be crucial for the accuracy of verification. We also
aim at handling bit-wise operations in the future that are extensively used in the
EVM bytecode. Advanced reasoning for arrays and maps (the only data structures
available in Ethereum smart contracts) can be also added to the framework
to gain further accuracy. This requires also further work on the decompilation
side. Along the same line, learning information on the types of variables during
decompilation will have an impact in the accuracy of the verification process.
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